We ll a gap in the theory of zero-knowledge protocols by presenting NP-arguments that achieve negligible error probability and computational zero-knowledge in four rounds of interaction, assuming only the existence of a one-way function. This result is optimal in the sense that four rounds and a one-way function are each individually necessary to achieve a negligible error zero-knowledge argument for NP.
Introduction
In a zero-knowledge ZK protocol, a prover P wants to convince" a veri er V that some claim is true, without revealing" any extra information GMR . In the theory of ZK protocols, researchers have looked at the complexity assumptions based on which protocols can be constructed, and the resources necessary to do so. Here we ll a gap in this area. Let us begin by explaining the various dimensions of such protocols.
The big picture
The interaction between P and V takes place on some common input x, and P is trying to convince V that x belongs to some underlying language L. The length of x is denoted n and one measures complexity in terms of n. The veri er is always a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm. Typically and here L is in NP. The system has two dimensions: conviction" and zero-knowledge."
Each can beformalized in one of two ways, a weak and a strong, depending on whether or not we restrict the adversary involved to polynomial time. To describe these dimensions, we use a terminology from BCY which they credit to Chaum.
Degrees of conviction. Conviction is about soundness." If x 6 2 L we ask that no matter how the prover behaves, it cannot convince V to accept, except with low probability called the error probability, and denoted . This has been formalized in two w a ys:
Statistical conviction: This is the notion of GMR . Even a computationally unrestricted prover should beunable to make the veri er accept x 6 2 L, except with probability n. Protocols providing this strong degree of conviction are usually called proofs."
Computational conviction: This is the notion of BrCr, BCC . A prover restricted to randomized polynomial time should beunable to make the veri er accept x 6 2 L, except with probability n.
1
But a more powerful prover might succeed in making the veri er accept with high probability. Although weaker, this kind of soundness is goodenough for cryptographic protocols. The soundness will typically depend on the assumed intractability of some computational problem, like factoring or computing discrete logarithms. Protocols meeting this condition are usually called arguments."
Degrees of zero-knowledge. Roughly, the zero-knowledge condition of GMR asks that when x 2 L, the transcript of an interaction between the prover and a veri er yield no information other than the fact that x 2 L t o a n a d v ersary who gets to examine the transcript. Again, this adversary may b e w eak or strong:
Statistical ZK: Even a computationally unrestricted adversary will not get useful information out of a transcript, except with low negligible probability. Protocols meeting this are usually called SZK.
Computational ZK: A randomized polynomial time adversary will not get useful information out of a transcript. But a computationally unrestricted adversary might. This will be the case when the transcript contains encryptions of sensitive data, which are useless to a polynomial time adversary, but can beopened by an unrestricted one. This type of ZK is usually called CZK and, although weaker, is good enough for cryptographic protocols. We clarify that this discussion is very informal. The de nitions talk of the indistinguishability o f ensembles. See Section 2.4. We also don't make perfect ZK a special case, considering it included 1 This description masks some subtleties. See De nition 2.1 and the following discussion.
as a sub-case of statistical.
A note on completeness. In addition, a basic completeness condition is always required. It asks that if x 2 L then there is a strategy via which the prover can make V accept. The de nition of BrCr, BCC asks as appropriate for a cryptographic protocol that this be e ciently achievable:
if P is given a witness for the membership of x in the NP language L then it can make V accept in polynomial time. The de nition of GMR does not make such a requirement. However, all known proofs statistically convincing for NP languages do meet this e cient completeness requirement, so we w on't discuss it further, assuming it always to be true.
A note on proofs of knowledge. One usually also wants that when x 2 L, the ability o f a prover to convince V to accept should be indicative of knowledge" of a witness. Like soundness, in proofs it holds for arbitrary provers and in arguments for polynomial time ones. The notion was suggested in GMR , and an appropriate formalization has emerged in BeGo . See Section 2.3 for more. Again, we will not discuss it further here, concentrating just on the two dimensions mentioned above. Four kinds of protocols. Since the dimensions discussed above are orthogonal, we get four kinds of protocols:
CZK arguments: Computationally convincing, computational ZK. The weakest kind, but still adequate for cryptographic protocols. For example the arguments for all of NP in BrCr, BCC when a standard bit commitment is used. CZK proofs: Statistically convincing, computational ZK. For example the proofs for all of NP in GMW . SZK arguments: Computationally convincing, statistical ZK. For example the arguments for all of NP in BrCr, BCC when a discrete logarithm based bit commitment is used; also NOVY . SZK proofs: Statistically convincing, statistical ZK. The strongest kind, but not possible for all of NP unless the polynomial time hierarchy collapses Fo . But there are examples for special languages: quadratic residuosity and its complement GMR ; graph isomorphism and its complement GMW ; constant round SZK proofs for quadratic residuosity and graph isomorphism BMO1 .
Complexity measures and optimality
Recall that the error-probability is the probability in the soundness condition, whether in a proof or an argument. Most atomic ZK protocols have constant error. But one really wants low error. A standard goal is to make the error negligible. That is, a function vanishing faster than the reciprocal of any polynomial. We will have the same goal.
Complexities to minimize. Theoretical research in ZK proofs has focused on achieving this low error while trying to minimize other complexity measures. Two main ones are: Rounds: The round complexity is the number of messages exchanged, or rounds of interaction in the protocol. There may be some danger of confusion in terminology. We call each sending of a message by a party a round. Some works like F eSh call this a move, and say a round is two consecutive m o v es. In their terminology, our four round protocols would be four move o r t w o round protocols. Assumptions: The complexity assumption underlying the protocol, it underlies either the computational ZK or the computational conviction or both. For example it may be an algebraic assumption like the hardness of factoring or discrete log computation, or a general assumption like the existence of claw-free pairs, trapdoor permutations, one-way permutations, or one-way functions.
Lower bounds. We know that things can't go too low. Four rounds and a one-way function are each individually necessary to get low-error ZK: Four rounds needed: Goldreich and Krawczyk GoKr show that there do not exist three r ound, negligible error whether proof or argument ZK whether computational or statistical protocols for NP unless NP BPP. There is a technical condition saying the ZK must beof a certain form called black-box. But all known ZK protocols are of this type. In this paper whenever we talk of ZK we always mean black box. See De nition 2.6. Accordingly, four is the minimal number of rounds required to achieve ZK with low error. The result also holds if the protocol is not sound but just a proof of knowledge, so that four rounds is also necessary for negligible knowledge error IS1 . One-way function needed: ZK arguments can be used to implement many kinds of cryptographic schemes, whence by ImLu require a one-way function to implement. Even for the proof case with a computationally unbounded prover, it is known that for hard" languages some kind of one-way function" is necessary OsWi . Thus, a one-way function is a minimal assumption required to achieve ZK.
The problem. There are many so-called atomic" ZK protocols for NP that achieve constant error-probability in constant three or four rounds. Serial repetition lowers the error and preserves ZK GoOr, ToWo , but at the cost of increasing the number of rounds to non-constant. So we w ould like to do parallel repetition. However, this is ruled out: rst, we h a v e the above mentioned results of GoKr ; second, the latter also showed that in general parallel repetition does not preserve ZK. So one must build low error ZK protocols directly.
Previous work. A good deal of e ort has gone into this, and a variety of ingenious constructions have been proposed. We summarize the known results in Figure 1 . One that may need elaboration is the protocol of Bl, FLS, BeYu . We discuss it brie y in Appendix A. Notice that prior to our work optimality had not been achieved in any protocol category. That is, neither for CZK arguments, SZK arguments or CZK proofs did we have four round, low error protocols based on any one-way function. In this paper we h a v e lled the rst of these gaps.
We also clarify that we are only tabulating ZK protocols for all of NP ie. for NP-complete languages. There is also a lot of work on constant round ZK especially statistical ZK for special languages which w e don't get into.
Our result
Result. We look at low error CZK arguments for all of NP. Figure 1 tells us that it is possible to do it in four rounds using an algebraic assumption hardness of discrete log FeSh ; or in ve rounds using a one-way function FeSh . This leaves a small but noticeable gap, which w e ll: we provide an optimal protocol, that uses only four rounds and a one-way function. Theorem 1.1 Suppose there exists a one-way function. Then for any language in NP, there exists a protocol which has four rounds of interaction; is computationally convincing ie. an argument with negligible error probability; is computational zero-knowledge; and is a computational proof of knowledge for the underlying NP-relation with negligible knowledge-error.
Techniques. Our protocol is for the NP-complete language SAT. Let ' bethe input formula. We use the idea of Feige and Shamir FeSh of ORing to ' some formula which represents some choices of the veri er, and then having the prover run a standard ZK proof on input = ' _ . However, Feige and Shamir FeSh begin their protocol by h a ving the veri er give a witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge of something underlying . Instead, we work directly with the one-way function, having the veri er give a cut-and-choose type proof that meets some conditions. This is interleaved with a standard ZK proof run on . To implement the latter with a one-way function we use Naor's bit commitment scheme Na which can be based on a one-way function via HILL .
The tricky part is getting the protocol to beZK. When the protocol is nally designed, however, the ZK is not hard to see. It turns out the technically more challenging part is to prove computational soundness. We i n troduce what seems to be a new technique, proving the soundness by using proofs of knowledge, relying on the strong formulation of the latter given in BeGo .
Open problems
We have lled the small existing gap between upper and lower bounds for CZK arguments. For other protocol categories, the existing gap is larger and still un lled. For CZK proofs, it is not known whether constant error can be achieved with a one-way function let alone with what value of the constant. For SZK arguments, it is not known whether it can be done at all ie. in polynomially many rounds with a one-way function.
De nitions
We provide de nitions for zero-knowledge arguments and computational proofs of knowledge.
Preliminaries
NP-relations. Let ; be a binary relation. We s a y that is an NP-relation if it is polynomial time computable and, moreover, there exists a polynomial p such that x; w = 1 implies jwj pjxj. For any x 2 f 0 ; 1 g w e let x = f w 2 f 0 ; 1 g : x; w = 1 g denote the witness set of x. We let L = f x 2 f 0 ; 1 g : x 6 = ; g denote the language de ned by . Note that a language L is in NP i there exists an NP-relation such that L = L . We s a y that is NP-complete if L is NP-complete.
The example we will concentrate on is satis ability. Let ' beaboolean formula circuit and T an assignment o f 0 = 1 v alues to its variables. We let Satisfy'; T = 1 if T satis es ' makes it true and 0 otherwise. This is an NP-relation, and the corresponding language L Satisfy is of course just SAT = f ' : ' is a satis able boolean formula g. Negligibility. Recall that a function : N ! R is negligible if for every polynomial p there exists an integer n p such that n 1=pn for every n n p .
Interactive algorithms. Parties in our protocols provers and veri ers are modeled as interactive functions. An interactive function A takes input x the common input, the conversation M 1 : : : M i so far, and coins R to output Ax; M 1 : : : M i ; R , which is either the next message, or some indicator to stop, perhaps accepting or rejecting in the process. Probabilities pertaining to this function are over the choice of R. We let A x ; = A x; ; and A x;R = A x; ; R . Typically we will have xed x and will betalking about A x ; sometimes we will also have xed R and are talking about the deterministic function A x;R . A may also take an auxiliary input w when A is the prover, this is a witness w 2 x and we write A w for this algorithm. Thus we can have A w x or A w x;R .
The transcript of a conversation between a pair of interactive functions is the entire sequence of messages exchanged between them until one of them halts. We let AccA x ; B x denote the probability o v er the coins of both parties that B accepts when talking to A on common input x. We let AccA x ; B x ; M 1 : : : M i denote the conditional probability that B accepts in talking to A on common input x when the conversation so far is M 1 : : : M i .
W e refer to the sending of a message by one party as a round of interaction. So the numberof rounds is the total number of messages sent.
Arguments, or computationally convincing proofs
The protocol must satisfy a standard completeness condition saying that a prover knowing a witness for x 2 L can convince the veri er to accept x. Soundness pertains to what happens when x 6 2 L .
We want to say that it is unlikely that one can make the veri er accept, even if one is allowed to modify the strategy of the prover. The error-probability measures how unlikely. For the purpose of this paper we are interested in arguments of negligible error, but the de nition that follows is for any error.
De nition 2.1 Let P;V bepolynomial time interactive algorithms and let bean NP-relation.
We s a y that P;Vis a computationally convincing proof or argument for , with error-probability , if the following two conditions are met:
1 Efficient completeness: For every x 2 L and every witness w 2 x it is the case that If is negligible then we s a y that the error-probability is negligible. Notice one di erence with de ning interactive proofs: we ask that the point at which the error goes down to depend on the prover b P. This is necessary, as the discussion below explains.
Note we s a y the system has negligible error as long as there is some negligible function such that the error is . This de nition of a negligible error argument di ers from previous ones like Go, NOVY , where the error corresponding to each prover is allowed to beadi erent negligible function, depending on the prover. However under such a de nition there is no particular function we can actually call the error-probability of the protocol. Accordingly, we prefer the de nition above. But it turns out that the notions are equivalent Be . This equivalence, captured in the following Proposition, will be instrumental in some of our proofs. Proposition 2.2 Be Let be an NP-relation. A pair P;Vof polynomial time interactive algorithms is a computationally convincing proof or argument for with negligible error-probability if and only if it meets the e cient completeness condition of De nition 2.1 and also the following modi ed computation soundness condition:
Computational soundness: For every polynomial time interactive algorithm b P there is a negligible function b P such that Acc b P x ; V x b P j x j for all x 6 2 L .
Issues in computational soundness. In the interactive proof setting GMR , the error-probability of a protocol P;V i s if for any x 6 2 L and any i n teractive algorithm b P playing the role of the prover, Acc b
The question of what is the error-probability of a computationally sound proof argument is more subtle. The rst thought is that we say the same thing, except restricting our attention to polynomial time prover algorithms. Namely, the error-probability is if Acc b P x ; V x j x j for any polynomial time interactive algorithm b P and any x 6 2 L. But this is not right. Underlying the argument is some computationally hard problem like i n v erting a one-way function. The size of this problem is proportional to jxj. So for any xed x there is some polynomial time prover who can convince the veri er with high probability, b y solving the underlying computational problem. In other words, we cannot, for a xed x 6 2 L, hope that the probability of convincing the veri er is at most jxj for all polynomial time provers. Unless the argument is in fact a proof. However, for any xed polynomial time prover, as jxj grows, the probability o f convincing the veri er decreases, because the size of the underlying hard computational problem is increasing. In particular it is reasonable to ask that for each b P the error eventually goes below the desired error-probability n, which is what we did above. For the case of error 1=3 the same de nition is given in Go . However the latter adopts a di erent approach to negligible error as discussed above.
In particular, the probability of convincing the veri er to accept x 6 2 L in a computationally convincing proof cannot bereasonably expected to be exponentially small. It is restricted by the probability of solving the underlying computational problem. Since the typical assumption is that the latter is negligible not but less, the error of the argument too is negligible but not less. In particular, independent repetition will not lower the error to exponentially small.
Another way to resolve the issue is to have a security parameter k that is separate from the input x and measures the size of the underlying hard problem. For any xed x, the error-probability still goes down as we increase k. This formulation is probably better for protocol design, but in the current theoretical setting, we stick, for simplicity, to just one input, and adopt the de nition above.
Computational proofs of knowledge
We w ant t o s a y that if an interactive algorithm can convince V to accept x 2 L then it must actually know" a witness w 2 x. This notion of a proof of knowledge" was suggested in GMR . It was formalized in BeGo both for the standard interactive proof setting and the argument, or computationally convincing setting. They discuss the latter in BeGo, Section 4.7 . We adopt their notion. It comes in two equivalent forms. We present both.
Recall an oracle algorithm E is an algorithm that can be equipped with an oracle. An invocation of the oracle counts as one step. We will talk of an extractor" E which will be given an oracle for b P x , a prover algorithm on input x, and will then try to nd a witness w to the membership of x in L . If is negligible then we s a y the proof has negligible knowledge-error.
In other words, if E has oracle access to b P then it can output a witness for membership of x in L with a probability only slightly less than the probability that b P would convince V to accept x. Again, note negligible knowledge error means the above is true for some negligible function .
In the next formulation the main one of BeGo the extractor must nd a witness with probability one. It is not limited to expected polynomial time, but must run in time inversely proportional to the excess of the accepting probability o v er the knowledge error. 
De nition 2.4 BeGo
If is negligible then we s a y the proof has negligible knowledge-error.
See BeGo for the proof that these two notions are equivalent. Sometimes it is convenient to use one, sometimes the other. Also see Be for some issues relating to the case of negligible knowledge error and alternative w a ys to de ne it.
Zero-knowledge
Ensembles and computational indistinguishability. We recall these notions of GoMi,
GMR . An ensemble indexed by L f0; 1g is a collection fExg x2L of probability spaces of nite support, one for each x 2 L. Let E 1 = fE 1 xg x2L and E 2 = fE 2 xg x2L be ensembles over a common index set L. A distinguisher is a polynomial sized family of circuits D = fD x g x2L , with one circuit for each x 2 L. We Zero-knowledge. Let P;V beinteractive algorithms. The de nition of a zero-knowledge interactive proof GMR refers to a language L. It begins by de ning a probability space, the view of a cheating veri er b V in talking to P on input x 2 L. And then says there is a simulator that on input x produces an indistinguishable" view. The basic idea is the same in the argument setting, but one must becareful about a couple of things. Recall prover P begins with a witness w to x. The view generated by P and V depends not just on P but on w. An elegant way to bring this into the picture is via the notion of a witness selector BeYu .
De nition 2.5 BeYu A witness selector for an NP-relation is a map W : L ! f0; 1g with the property that Wx 2 x for each x 2 L .
That is, a witness selector is just a way of xing an association of a particular witness to each input. When = Satisfy and L = SAT this just means associating to any formula x = ' 2 SAT a particular satisfying assignment to it, out of all the possible satisfying assignments. Now we can de ne the view. Let P;V beinteractive algorithms, an NP-relation, and W a witness selector for . We let ViewP;W; V ; x bethe probability space whose points are of the form R; , where R is a random tape for V x and is a transcript of an interaction between P Wx x and V x;R . The associated probability is that over the choice of R and the coins of P Wx x . The collection fViewP;W; b V ; x g x 2 L becomes an ensemble.
We de ne zero-knowledge in a strong black-box" simulation form. The simulator S is an oracle algorithm given input x and oracle access to b V x;R where R has been chosen at random. Note formally, zero-knowledge is no longer a property of the language L but of the relation itself.
Under this de nition of zero-knowledge, we know that any negligible error probability zeroknowledge argument for an NP-complete relation must have at least four rounds, assuming NP is not in BPP GoKr . We w ant to meet this bound given only a one-way function. Remark. The above notion of black-box simulation zero-knowledge is stronger than those of GoOr, GoKr, BMO2 in the following sense. In our notion, the simulator has no control over the coins R of b V x : they are automatically chosen at random and then xed. The simulator does not even have direct access to them: it just gets an oracle for b V x;R . In the notions of GoOr, GoKr , the simulator could choose these coins as it liked, even try running b V x on many di erent random tapes. In the notion of BMO2 it could not choose them, but did have direct access to them, and could try several random tapes. However, since our results are positive, making a more stringent de nition only strengthens them. Also, all known zero-knowledge protocols do meet our de nition.
For simplicity w e do not talk of non-uniform veri ers, but of course the above de nition could be extended to include them.
3 Building blocks for our protocol Our protocol uses one-way functions, satis ability, and a standard bit commitment based atomic ZK protocol for satis ability.
One-way functions
Let f : f0; 1g ! f0; 1g besome length-preserving function. An inverter for f is a family I = fI n g n1 where each I n is a circuit, taking n bit inputs and yielding n bit outputs, and having size at most pn for some polynomial p. We let Inv I f n = Pr h fx 0 = y : x R f 0 ; 1 g n ; y f x ; x 0 I n y i denote the probability that I n successfully inverts f at the point y = fx, taken over a random choice of x 2 f 0 ; 1 g n . De nition 3.1 A polynomial time computable, length-preserving function f : f0; 1g ! f 0 ; 1 g is one-way if there is a negligible function such that for every inverter I there is an integer N I such that Inv I f n n for all n N I .
Again this de nition is actually di erent from the standard one: the latter allows the inversion probability of each inverter to be a di erent negligible function. However, the two notions are equivalent Be .
Hereafter we x a one-way function f, and the notation f will always refer to this xed function.
Formulas and satis ability
We will present ZK arguments for the NP-complete language SAT. More precisely let Satisfy be the NP-relation de ned by Satisfy'; T = 1 if assignment T satis es formula '. The corresponding language L Satisfy is of course SAT = f ' : ' is a satis able boolean formula g. We will present ZK arguments for the NP-relation Satisfy meeting the de nitions in Section 2. In terms of those de nitions, the NP-relation here is = Satisfy, the common input is x = ', a boolean formula, and the witness w is a satisfying assignment T to '.
We will be encoding statements about the one-way function f as formulas, and need some standard features of the Cook-Levin theorem. The NP-completeness of SAT as proved in this theorem implies the following. There is a polynomial time computable transformation Formula f such that for any y 2 f 0 ; 1 g it is the case that Formula f y is a boolean formula which is satis able i there exists an x 2 f 0 ; 1 g such that fx = y . More important, there are polynomial time computable maps t f;1 ; t f;2 called witness transformations with the following properties. Given x, map t f;1 outputs a satisfying assignment T = t f;1 x t o F ormula f fx. Conversely, given a satisfying assignment T to Formula f y, map t f;2 outputs a point x = t f;2 T such that fx = y . W e will refer to both the transformation Formula f and to the accompanying witness transformations in what follows. What is important to rememberis that knowledge of a satisfying assignment T to Formula f y is tantamount to knowledge of a pre-image x of y under f.
3.3 Naor's commitment scheme
We will use Naor's commitment scheme Na which can be based on any one-way function via HILL . Some special properties of the scheme are important for us. not bad. Naor's scheme has the property that a randomly chosen commitment setup string is bad with probability exponentially small in n Na, Claim 3.1 . For our purposes we set the parameters of the scheme so that this probability i s 2 , 2 n . The length of R required to make this true depends not only on n but also on the data length m. In what follows, we assume R is of the right length to make this true with respect to whatever data length we h a v e. It follows that the probability that even one out of n random commitment setup strings R 1 ; : : : ; R n is bad is at most n 2 ,2n 2 ,n .
This will be used repeatedly in what follows.
The atomic protocol
We use as a primitive a atomic four round ZK argument a c hieving error 1=2. We now specify the properties we w ant of it and the notation used to describe it. To a v oid depending on the details of any speci c protocol, it is described via generic components and steps. The protocol. In the literature there are several commitment-based three round ZK arguments with error 1=2. For concreteness, take the one of Brassard, Cr epeau and Chaum BCC , or the one based on general commitment in ImYu . To set it up using one-way function based commitment, we rst have the veri er send a commitment setup string, and then run a protocol such as the ones in BCC, ImYu , so that we h a v e four rounds.
To a v oid depending on the details of any speci c underlying protocol, we describe the protocol via generic components and steps. Let denote the boolean formula which is the common input.
The prover is assumed to have a satisfying assignment T for . We now specify the instructions for the parties, with the nomenclature to be explained later:
1 Veri er picks at random a commitment setup string R and sends it to the prover. 2 Prover picks a random string and computes an encapsulated circuit C = EncCirc f ; T ; R ; . This is sent to the veri er.
3 Veri er picks a random challenge bit c and sends it to the prover. 4 Prover computes an answer D = Answer f ; T ; R ; ; c and sends it to the veri er.
5 Veri er checks that Check f ; R ; C ; c ; D = 1 . If this is true it accepts, else rejects. Now let us explain the components. In the second step, the prover computes an object C we call an encapsulated circuit." This step will involve a n umber of bit commitments which is proportional to the size of , and they are performed, here, using the scheme of Section 3.3, which can be implemented given f. The commitment setup string used for all the commitments is R, and represents some random choices that underly the encapsulation. Roughly, the prover will rst create a randomized version of that is annotated with the values given by the truth assignment T. This annotated circuit, call it d, w ould reveal T, but the prover does not send it directly. Instead, he commits to it, sending Commit f R; d; s where s is part of . But the details, such as what is d, will not matter: later we will summarize all the properties we need. As in a typical cut-and-choose protocol, the veri er then poses a random challenge question, which is the bit c, and prover must open" the encapsulated circuit in one of two ways. This answer" of the prover, denoted D, is computed as a function of the truth assignment, the challenge, and the random choices underlying the original encapsulation. It consists of de-committing certain parts of C. The answer being sent to the veri er, the latter checks that it is correct. The check is a function of the encapsulated circuit, the commitment setup string, the challenge, and the answer provided.
Properties. We assume certain properties of this protocol. The standard example protocols eg. BCC do have these properties.
We assume that if an encapsulated circuit C is successfully opened" in both ways, ie. for both a 0-challenge and a 1-challenge, then one can obtain the truth assignment underlying . This is true no matter how C was constructed, and is the technical fact underlying the protocol being a computational proof of knowledge with knowledge error 1=2.
More precisely, there is a polynomial time algorithm Extract f such that the following is true.
Suppose R is a good commitment setup string. Let C be some string sent b y the prover in the rst step. It purports to be a correctly computed encapsulated circuit. Let D 0 ; D 1 be strings such that We stress that this requires the commitment setup string R to be good as de ned in Section 3.3.
We are using the fact that when this happens, it is impossible not just computationally infeasible for the commiter here the prover to open a commitment i n t w o di erent w a ys.
We will need to show our protocol is ZK that one can compute EncCirc f ; T ; R ; for any T, not just a T that satis es . The underlying annotated circuit d will be non-sensical in this case, but the veri er will not know, because the annotated circuit is provided in committed form. Of course, a prover providing such an encapsulated circuit will be hard put to answer the challenges, but that will not matter for us.
Finally, of course, we also need that the protocol is ZK. Actually, all we will use is that it is witness indistinguishable in the sense of FeSh , something which follows from its being ZK.
Protocol 4R-ZK and its properties
We n o w describe our protocol and its properties. We call the protocol 4R-ZK for four round ZK."
Protocol description
We give instructions for the prover P and the veri er V to execute protocol 4R-ZK. The common input is a formula ' of size n, and the prover is assumed in possession of a satisfying assignment T to '. Refer to Section 3 for the notation and components referred to below.
1 The veri er's message M 1 = M 1;1 M 1;2 consists of two parts computed as we n o w describe.
1.1 For i = 1 ; : : : ; n and j = 0 ; 1 the veri er chooses x i;j R f 0 ; 1 g n and sets y i;j = fx i;j .
These points are hereafter called the Y -values." It lets M 1;1 consist of these 2n strings.
1.2 The veri er picks at random commitment setup strings R 1 ; : : : ; R n . It is thereby initiating n parallel runs of the atomic protocol: R i will play the role of the commitment setup string for the i-th run. But the input formula for these runs has however not yet been de ned! That will appear later. It sets M 1;2 = R 1 ; : : : ; R n .
The veri er sends M 1 = M 1;1 M 1;2 to the prover. Now for i = 1; : : : ; n and j = 0; 1 we let i;j = Formula f y i;j as per Section 3.2. This is a formula both parties can now compute.
2 The prover receives M 1 . Its reply M 2 = M 2;1 M 2;2 consists of two parts computed as we n o w describe. is viewed as selecting the Y -value y i;b i , and the veri er is being asked to reveal the pre-image of this value, which he will do in the next step.
The
2.2 We n o w set = 1;1,b 1 _ : : : _ n;1,bn . This is the OR of all formulas corresponding to Y -values which the prover has not asked be revealed. As long as f is one-way, the prover has very little chance of knowing a satisfying assignment to . We then set = _ '. Notice that T the satisfying assignment to ' that the prover has is also a satisfying assignment t o , s o t h e p r o v er has a satisfying assignment t o e v en though he does not have one for . Viewing R 1 ; : : : ; R n as commitment setup strings initiating n parallel runs of the atomic protocol on common input , the prover will now perform the second step for each of these executions of the atomic protocol. Namely, for i = 1 ; : : : ; n it picks at random a string i to be used as coins in the encapsulated circuit computation, and computes C i = EncCirc f ; T ; R i ; i for i = 1 ; : : : ; n . He now sets M 2;2 = C 1 ; : : : ; C n .
The prover sends M 2 = M 2;1 M 2;2 to the veri er. Notice that the protocol is indeed of four rounds. Next we address its properties.
Result
Our claims about the above protocol are summarized in the following theorem. Refer to Section 2 for de nitions of the various notions.
Theorem 4.1 Assume f is a one-way function. Then protocol 4R-ZK is: 1 A computationally convincing proof ie. an argument with negligible error probability, 2 A computational proof of knowledge with negligible knowledge error, and 3 A computational zero-knowledge protocol, all for the NP-relation Satisfy corresponding to the NP-complete language SAT.
We will prove these items in turn. As one might imagine, the di culty in the protocol design was making sure it was ZK. Having done the design to make this work out, however, it will be relatively easy to show. The other claims turn out to bemore non-trivial. In particular the soundness is shown via a novel use of proofs of knowledge. We begin with a technical lemma that underlies the rst two claims above.
The -Extraction Lemma
The rst two claims about the protocol are that it is computationally convincing and a computational proof of knowledge. The rst says that if ' is unsatis able then a polynomial time prover has little chance of convincing the veri er to accept, and the second says that if ' is satis able then any prover convincing the veri er to accept actually knows" a satisfying assignment to '. Both these claims pertain to the input formula '. Yet our main technical lemma is a claim not about ' but about the formula constructed in the protocol. Remember this formula a random variable depending on other choices in the protocol is the one on which the atomic protocol is actually run. The crucial property of this formula is that as long as the veri er is honest, namely is V i t is always satis able: whether or not ' is satis able, is, because is always satis able. We claim that if a prover A convinces V to accept ' then we can extract a satisfying assignment for , regardless of whether or not ' is satis able. Furthermore, this extraction can bedone to meet the kinds of conditions asked in the de nition of BeGo . This will help prove both the above mentioned claims, and, as motivation, it may help to say w h y . Roughly, an assignment t o corresponds to knowledge of inverses of f on random points. But remember='_. So if ' is unsatis able, then an assignment t o m ust be an assignment to , and this will enable us to say i n Lemma 4.3 that signi cant success in making the veri er accept when ' is unsatis able translates to inverting the one-way function f. On the other hand, if ' is satis able then an assignment to will with high probability be one to ' since otherwise someone is inverting f. Now let us state and prove the lemma.
Lemma 4.2 There is an expected polynomial time oracle algorithm E the extractor such that for any prover A and formula ' the following is true. Let R be a random tape for A ' and M 1 M 2 M 3;1 a partial transcript of an interaction between A ';R and V ' . The transcript includes the rst two messages of the protocol and the rst part of V 's third message. Assume the commitment setup strings in M 1 are good. Let n = j'j. Let p = AccA ';R ; V ' ; M 1 M 2 M 3 ; 1 be the probability that V accepts given the current partial transcript. Then on input '; M 1 M 2 M 3;1 and with oracle access to A ';R , algorithm E outputs a satisfying assignment t o the formula de ned by the above partial transcript as in the description of our protocol, and this with probability at least p , 2 ,n . Proof: LetR = R 1 ; : : : ; R n be the sequence of commitment setup strings in M 1 . We know that M 2 = b;C whereC = C 1 ; : : : ; C n and C i is supposed to be an encapsulated circuit as per an execution of the atomic protocol on input . be the nal evaluation predicate of our veri er.
We rst describe a di erent oracle algorithm E 1 . It takes the same inputs as E should. It always returns a satisfying assignment to , and this within an expected number of steps bounded by polyn=p , 2 ,n . We can assume p 2 , n since otherwise there is nothing to show.
Algorithm E 1 will sample responses of A ';R for di erent random challenge vectorsc, k eeping other information xed, until it nds a pair of challenge vectors that are accepted by V but are di erent in at least one component. Namely:
Repeat:
Pickc t = c t;1 ; : : : ; c t;n c . The probability that a randomc is good is p so one is found in expected 1=p tries. Another di erent one is then found in expected 1=p , 2 ,n tries. So the pair is found within 2=p , 2 ,n tries. Each try being polyn time, we have the claimed time bound on the expected running time of E 1 . Finally, w e need to specify the extractor E claimed in the lemma. We apply a trick used in BeGo to prove the equivalence of De nitions 2.3 and 2.4. On input '; M 1 M 2 M 3;1 and with oracle access to A ';R , algorithm E produces M 3;2 as V would this consists of just picking n random challenges, sets M 3 = M 3;1 M 3;2 , and runs A ';R to get the response M 4 = A ';R M 1 M 2 M 3 . If the resulting transcript is rejecting as can bedetermined by running the veri er's check then E just aborts.
If not, it nonetheless aborts with probability exactly 2 ,n . If neither of these aborts happens, it runs E 1 . Since it runs E 1 with probability p , 2 ,n , it nds the satisfying assignment with this probability, and moreover its expected running time is polyn + p , 2 , n polyn=p,2 ,n which is polyn.
Protocol 4R-ZK is computationally convincing
We will justify the rst claim of Theorem 4.1 by proving the following: Lemma 4.3 Assume f is a one-way function. Then protocol 4R-ZK is a computationally sound proof for the NP-relation Satisfy, a c hieving negligible error-probability. We rst remark and explain that there is indeed something non-trivial to be proven here. Typically, error-reduction is done by serial or parallel repetition. Firstly, that's not what we are doing; there is some repetition in the protocol, but the protocol itself does not consist of independently repeating some atomic protocol. Moreover, even when the input ' is unsatis able, the atomic sub-protocols are actually being run on a satis able formula namely . So we are not counting on the soundness of the atomic protocol to prove the soundness of our protocol! As mentioned earlier, our approach is to use proofs of knowledge, and in particular Lemma 4.2. Let us now provide the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.3: It is easy to see that the speci ed polynomial time prover strategy P in 4R-ZK will meet the e cient completeness condition of De nition 2.1. The issue is to show that computational soundness is achieved, and with the claimed negligible error. Let us assume protocol 4R-ZK does not have negligible error-probability. So it does not meet the computational soundness condition of Proposition 2.2. Hence there exists a polynomial time prover b P and an in nite set F of unsatis able boolean formulae such that Acc b P ' ; V ' j ' j for all ' 2 F, where = 1 =p 0 . 3 We will show this contradicts the assumption that f is one-way. We will show that there is an inverter I, a polynomial p 1 , and an in nite set K of integers such that Inv I f n 1=p 1 n for all n 2 K. As per De nition 3.1, this implies f is not one-way.
Let us set p 1 n = 64np 0 n and = 1 =p 1 . Let K bethe set of all integers n for which F contains a formula ' of length n. For each n 2 K we x arbitrarily some formula ' n 2 F. Before describing the inverter I for f we need to isolate certain executions of the interaction between b P ' and V ' , where ' = ' n .
Good executions. Let n 2 K and let ' = ' n . Let R bearandom tape for b P ' and M 1 M 2 M 3;1 a partial transcript of an interaction between P ';R and V ' . The transcript includes the rst two messages of the protocol and the rst part of V 's third message. We s a y that R;M 1 M 2 M 3;1 is good if the commitment setup string in M 1 is good as de ned in Section 3.3 and also AccP ';R ; V ' ; M 1 M 2 M 3 ; 1 n = 2 the probability here is only over the choice of the veri er's challenge vectorc, since all other quantities are xed. Since Acc b P ' ; V ' n i t m ust be that the probability o v er R and the coins of V leading to M 1 M 2 M 3;1 that AccP ';R ; V ' ; M 1 M 2 M 3 ; 1 n = 2 is at least 1=2. On the other hand the probability that the commitment setup string in M 1 is bad is 2 ,n cf. Section 3.3. So the probability that R;M 1 M 2 M 3;1 is goodis at least 1=4. In the sequel we will focus on these good transcript pre xes.
Structure of inverter. We now describe an inverter I for f. The inverter I is a polynomial sized collection of circuits fI n : n 1g as described in Section 3.1. Meaning there is a polynomial p 2 such that the size of I n is at most p 2 n for all n 1. We will show that that for all n 2 K we have Inv I f n n = n = 64n. I n has embedded into it the formula ' n which b y assumption is unsatis able. The input to I n is a n-bit string y = fx where x was chosen at random from f0; 1g n . I n wants to output a pre-image of y under f. We describe I n as a randomized algorithm.
The coins can always be later eliminated by using the non-uniformity. Think if I n as having oracle access to b P ' where ' = ' n . Meaning it will feed it messages and run it, sometimes backing it up" and so forth. It implements this by running b P as a subroutine with the common input xed to '. It is important here that b P is polynomial time. It begins by picking a random string R for b P ' and initializing the latter with that. First move. I n will mimic the rst move o f V , with a slight t wist. It picks R n and R f 0 ; 1 g .
Then for i = 1; : : : ; n and j = 0; 1 it does the following: If i; j = ; then set y i;j = y, else pick x i;j R f 0 ; 1 g n and set y i;j = fx i;j . We let i;j = Formula f y i;j bethe boolean formula resulting from applying Cook's theorem to the f = " relation on input y i;j , as described in Section 3.2. Now I n also picks random strings R 1 ; : : : ; R n , of appropriate length, as setup strings for the bit commitment to be used in the atomic protocol. It lets M 1 consist of the strings y i;j for i = 1 ; : : : ; n and j = 0 ; 1, together with R 1 ; : : : ; R n . This, thought of as the rst message of V to b P ' , is then sent" to b P ' . Second move. I n runs b P ' to get its response M 2 = b P ' M 1 ; R to the veri er message M 1 . This response has the form M 2 = M 2;1 M 2;2 where M 2;1 = b 1 ; : : : ; b n and M 2;2 = C 1 ; : : : ; C n . Here C i is supposed to beacommittal for a run of the atomic protocol on input = ' _ , where = 1 ; 1 , b 1 _ : : : _ n;1,bn .
Opening. Recall that V ' is supposed to return x i;b i to b P ' for all i = 1 ; : : : ; n . I n w ould like t o d o the same. But if b = then this means it must return a pre-image of y ; under f, and it does not know such a pre-image. Indeed, the goal of I n is to nd one. So in this case I n aborts. But this can only happen with probability 1 = 2 since was a random bit. In case b 6 = , our I n sets M 3;1 =x = x 1 ;b 1 ; : : : ; x n;bn . This is the rst part of a veri er message M 3 to be sent t o b P ' . Finding a witness for . Now comes the important step. I n will run an extractor" for the protocol which consists of n parallel runs of the atomic protocol on input and nd a satisfying assignment for . Speci cally, w e apply Lemma 4.2. Let E be as in that lemma and let p 3 be the polynomial which is its expected running time. I n runs E on input '; M 1 M 2 M 3;1 , giving it oracle access to b P ';R . However, this execution is halted in 8p 3 n= n = 8p 3 np 0 n steps. Recall E has an expected polynomial running time, but I n needs to halt within a xed polynomial amount o f time. If E nds, within this time, a satisfying assignment T to = ' _ , then I n will be able to nd what it wants, namely a point x satisfying fx = y . The crucial observation is that since ' is unsatis able, the assignment T must satisfy . Hence it must satisfy i;1,b i for some i 2 n . Since was chosen at random from n it will be the case that i = with probability a t least 1=n. We know b 6 = since otherwise we aborted above meaning b = 1 , . So we h a v e an assignment t o ; . Now recall that ; = Formula f y. Applying the witness transformation t f;2 discussed in Section 3.2, we can compute a string x such that fx = y . I n does this and outputs x. Analysis. The running time of I n is clearly polyn. We must analyze its success probability. We assume R;M 1 M 2 M 3;1 is good in the sense de ned above: we saw this happens with probability at least 1=4. This means the commitment setup strings in M 1 are good and p = AccP ';R ; V ' ; M 1 M 2 M 3 ; 1 n = 2. Now Lemma 4.2 says that E would nd a satisfying assignment to with probability a t least p , 2 ,n n=2 , 2 ,n n = 4, for large enough n. Since we halt E within 8= n times its expected running time, Markov's inequality says we nd the assignment with at least the original probability minus n=8. So I n nds x with probability a t least n=4, n=8 = n = 8. Putting this together with the other probability losses, all together, I n succeeds with probability at least n=64n = n , as desired.
Protocol 4R-ZK is a computational proof of knowledge
The second claim of Theorem 4.1 is justi ed by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4 Assume f is a one-way function. Then protocol 4R-ZK is a computational proof of knowledge with negligible knowledge error for the NP-relation Satisfy.
Before proving it let us discuss the issues. Given a satis able formula ' and oracle access to a polynomial time prover b P, the goal is to extract a satisfying assignment to ', with a success probability only marginally less than the probability that b P ' convinces V ' to accept. We can easily run the extractor of Lemma 4.2 to nd a satisfying assignment T, but for , not '. But = '_. Our worry is that T satis es , not '. However, intuitively not, because a satisfying assignment t o corresponds to the ability t o invert f, and thus should appear only with negligible probability. To capture this intuition we must show that were T to satisfy too often then there would be a way t o i n v ert f. We can do this similarly to the proof of Lemma 4. Since E runs in expected polynomial time, it is easy to see that E 1 does too. Similarly, given Lemma 4.2, it is easy to see that with probability at least p , 2 ,n+1 , algorithm E 1 outputs a satisfying assignment T to not '!, where p = Acc b P ' ; V ' . We loose the additional 2 ,n over the success probability of E because the commitment setup strings are bad with probability at most 2 ,n cf. Section 3.3 and E 1 aborts in this case. But our goal is to nd a satisfying assignment to '. Remember=_'. Our worry is that T satis es rather than '. Intuitively, however, not, because we know that the ability to nd an assignment to corresponds to the ability t o i n v ert f. Thus it might happen, but only negligibly often. We m ust now capture this.
We must show there exists a negligible function such that T is a satisfying assignment to ' with probability p , n, for all ' of size at least N b P , where N b P is an integer depending on b P. Assume towards a contradiction that there is no such . So given any negligible function there is a polynomial time prover b P and an in nite set F of formulas such that when ' 2 F, the assignment T output by E 1 satis es rather than ' with probability at least p,2 ,n ,p,n = n,2 ,n . We m ust show that this implies f is not one-way.
We will not give the construction and proof for this last statement in full because the idea is essentially the same as in the proof of Lemma 4.3. We begin by applying Be to be able to work with a function that is not negligible. We use the composite of E b P 1 as an algorithm to construct an inverter for f. Like in the proof of Lemma 4.3, we are given a value y and want to nd a pre-image of y under f. We put y into the rst message of the veri er in the same way as before. Eventually when E b P 1 gives us an assignment T to , it has some probability o f satisfying Formula f y and then we get a pre-image of y under f, just as before. The details can be lled in by looking at the proof of Lemma 4.3.
Protocol 4R-ZK is zero-knowledge
The third claim of Theorem 4.1 is justi ed by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5 Assume f is a one-way function. Then protocol 4R-ZK is a computational zeroknowledge protocol.
Proof: We must specify a simulator S for which De nition 2.6 is met. S has input ' and oracle access to b V ';R where b V is any possibly cheating polynomial time veri er algorithm and R is a randomly chosen random tape for b V ' . It must produce a transcript such that R; is distributed like random members of the view of the real interaction between P ' and b V ' . Before describing the algorithm let us sketch the intuition.
S will be trying to produce the prover moves in a conversation with b V ';R . Of course, not knowing a satisfying assignment for ', it can't really play the prover. But recall the atomic protocol is run not on input ' but on input = '_. The trick is that it su ces to know a satisfying assignment for . Indeed, suppose we know some satisfying assignment for . This is not necessarily a satisfying assignment for '. Still, we can mimic the prover" by using this assignment in the atomic protocol. The veri er will never know it was not an assignment to ', because the proof is ZK and hence it can compute a satisfying assignment T to the formula ;b 0 . This is via the properties of Cook's reduction as explained in Section 3.2. But then T also satis es and hence , so S has in its possession a satisfying assignment t o . Now the idea is to act like the real prover on input this assignment. Note this assignment does not satisfy ', but the veri er will never be able to tell, because it does satisfy the formula on which the atomic protocol is performed, and the bit commitments are secure. So for each i = 1 ; : : : ; n the simulator picks at random some coins i and computes an encapsulated circuit C i = EncCirc f ; T ; R i ; i for . We let M 2 = M 2;1 M 2;2 where M 2;1 = b 1 ; : : : ; b n and M 2;2 = C 1 ; : : : ; C n . We view M 2 as a second protocol message from the prover. Step 4 and try again, continuing this loop until the check does pass. This is a standard procedure, used for example in BMO1 , and as there one can show that the expected numberof tries in this process is at most 2. So we go on assuming the check did pass.
6 Having a satisfying assignment T to , the simulator now in guise of the prover is able to answer the challenges c 1 ; : : : ; c n b y opening the appropriate parts of the encapsulated circuits C 1 ; : : : ; C n just as the prover would. Namely S can compute D i = Answer f ; T ; R i ; i ; c i for i = 1 ; : : : ; n and let M 4 consist of D 1 ; : : : ; D n . Fix some witness selector W : SAT ! f0; 1g for the relation Satisfy; . That is, W' is a satisfying assignment to ' for every ' 2 SAT. As perDe nition 2.6 we want to show that the probability ensembles E 1 = fS b V' 'g '2SAT and E 2 = fViewP;W; b V ; ' g ' 2 SAT are computationally indistinguishable. Refer to Section 2.4 for the de nition of S. We will do this under the assumption that f is a one-way function. We will provide here only a brief outline of the intuition behind this proof.
The function f shows up in two places in the protocol. First, f is used in the construction of Y -values underlying the formula . Second, f underlies the bit commitment s c heme of the atomic protocol. The rst use of f is not a concern for the zero-knowledge, in the sense that the protocol would beZK but not computationally convincing or a computational proof of knowledge! even if the function used to produce the Y -values was not one-way. The ZK depends however on the security of the bit commitment s c heme, and hence indirectly on the one-wayness of f.
The privacy cf. Section 3.3 of the bit commitment s c heme means that when S, in Step 2, forms an encapsulated circuit using a dummy truth assignment T 0 , the veri er b V has no feasible way to detect it, and its behavior can change only negligibly." Now, in
Step 4 the simulator uses a satisfying assignment for that is di erent from the one the prover would use. But since the atomic protocol is ZK it is also witness indistinguishable in the sense of FeSh . Furthermore, they show that witness indistinguishability i s preserved under parallel repetition, so the protocol consisting of n parallel repetitions of the atomic protocol is also witness indistinguishable. So the transcripts produced for the two di erent witnesses in protocol 4R-ZK have computationally indistinguishable distributions. The formal proof would bebycontradiction. We assume the ensembles are not computationally V ; ' i j ' j whenever ' 2 F. Using D we w ould do one of the following. Either construct a polynomial sized circuit family that defeated the privacy of the bit commitment s c heme, which w ould contradict the security of this scheme as proven in Na, HILL . Or, build a distinguisher that would contradict the witness indistinguishability o f n parallel repetitions of the atomic protocol. We omit these proofs from this abstract.
